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PREFACE
This study of the Department of Defense program system and
its impact upon the Marine Corps was undertaken primarily as a
self-education effort to expand my knowledge of the Marine Corps
in relation to the larger environment in which it exists and
functions. Attempts to limit all considerations of this study to
the Marine Corps (even to the Department of Defense), in isolation
from politics and national events, proved unworkable at an early
stage of the research. Thus I learned that the defense establish-
ment's character is a blend of the nation's fortunes, its
fortitude, and its fears; an everchanging blend, a product of its
time.
Implementation of the Department of Defense program system
reflects many influences of Twentieth Century America through its
exploitation of new knowledge and utilization of new technology.
At an earlier time, in a less complex environment with lesser
tools, this system would have been a failure or at best superfluous.
Today, it represents a bold and apparently successful effort to
make planning for the unknown and the unwanted less susceptible to
gross error and, therefore, more apt to be responsive to national
policy objectives.
The information for this study was collected through
library research, personal interviews, and contacts with military
li

officers and government officials, both in and out of the Department
of Defense. Several interview comments and speakers 1 remarks are
indicated as "quoted" material in the text of this paper. A
diligent effort was made to accurately reproduce these oral
statments in the form and context in which they were made, so as
to retain, Insofar as possible, the individual's oontent, meaning,
and feeling. In this regard, no single statement nor any
individual's remarks should be construed as reflecting any
"official position" other than his own.
Chapter I considers the early years of the Department of
Defense and efforts to control and direct it. Chapter II
introduces the Department of Defense program system. Chapter III
explores observations of its general effects as witnessed by
officials of the Department of the Navy from 1961 to 1965.
Individual service planning and programming of the Marine
Corps (before the introduction of the Department of Defense program
system) is covered in Chapter IV. Chapter V covers effects of the
program system on Marine Corps activities of planning, programming,
and budgeting. Chapter VI has a summary of the overall impacts of
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THE BACKGROUND FOR SERVICE PLANNING
The National Security Act of 1947 stands as a milepost in
United States military organizational history. This legislation
established the Department of Defense as the major institution in
a comprehensive program to provide for the security of the United
States.
Organization for defense .--The National Security Act
provided for three categories within the defense organization.
The National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the National Security Resources Board oomprised one category
and were established to advise the President. The national
military establishment was composed of two categories or echelons,
The first of these was centered around the Secretary of Defense
and consisted of four committee organizations: the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), the War Council, the Munitions Board, and the
Research and Development Board. The second military echelon was
comprised of the Department of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, and the newly created Department of the Air Force.
Roles and missions of the military services within the
defense establishment were assigned and outlined as minimum

2functions for the respective services. * Congress appeared Intent
upon the preservation of Its powers of legislative control of the
nation's armed forces. By assigning statutory roles and missions
through legislation, Congress made its intentions known, namely,
to Impose a direct limit on the powers of the Secretary of Defense
and the power of the President. Congress was not inclined to allow
merger of the services, nor to allow the parts to be played by
individual services to be determined solely by the Secretary of
Defense or by the President.
Efforts at reorganization.—The first department heads of
the newly created Department of Defense faced real challenges in
attempting to direct their department. These early secretaries
had legal authority without seeming to have effective authority.
Their claims varied from too little authority to too little
cooperation from the individual services. The right kind of
advice seemed hard for these early secretaries to find; service
department heads were independent and often disagreed. All the
complex problems seemed to come at once; no one of them could be
completely solved before it became dwarfed by others of more
consequence. Something more had to be done to bring about firm
direction and control of the Department of Defense.
This apparent lack of uniformity and control was not in
accord with "organizational folklore" concerning military command
and control. Nor was It in keeping with concepts of unification.
Efforts made within the framework of existing legislation did not
1U. S., Statutes at Large, IX I, 253, Sections 205-208.

3seem adequate to the task. Efforts at ignoring the problems were
made by these early secretaries only at the gravest of risks for
the security of the nation. Waiting only proved that the problems
would not go away. Service answers were too often service-oriented;
solution seemed to require new legislation and reorganization. So
there followed, over the years after the passage of the National
Security Act, three major defense reorganizations which resulted in
important changes: the first in 1949, another in 1953, and the last
in 1958. 1
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 .—The National
Military Establishment in 1949 became a single executive department
with the Secretary of Defense as its head. Secretaries of the
services were no longer to sit on the National Security Council.
According to John Ries
:
These changes denied the services a direct role
In defense policy-making. They were merely semi-
autonomous administrative sub-divisions of the new
executive department. All these provisions were in
keeping with the hierarchial general staff concept
of organization.
2
A deputy secretary and two other assistant secretaries were
authorized by the 1949 Amendments. The earlier boards (Munitions
and Research and Development) were changed to staff agencies and
a non-voting chairman was added to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Ijohn C. Ries, The Management of Defense (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. xvi-xvii.
2 Ibid ., p. 141.

4Title IV of the National Security Aot Amendments of 1949
established the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and
a comptroller in each of three military services. This was a
step toward promotion of economy and efficiency through uniform
budgetary and flsoal procedures. It was also a giant step toward
strengthening the position and influence of the Secretary of
Defense,
The reorganization of 1953.—During the period 1949-1953,
the Secretary of Defense relied increasingly on his assistants,
the board chairmen, and his staff for advice. Civilian service
secretaries, even service leaders, began to lose their influence
on policy-making.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were left alone to direct
military operations with little guidance from the Secretary in
terms of military policy. Budgets of the individual services were
balanced out more or less equally. Unified efforts in establishing
overall goals were not demanded in these times:
In times of plenty /as in Fiscal Years 51, 52, and 5^7,
each service tended to build its own systems that it
considered vital with little concern for harmony of
doctrine or possible overlaps. In times of scarcity, this
would lead to bitter rivalry over missions as well as
dollars. There was no overriding organizational device
or duty that required service chiefs to think alike or to
"spontaneously consider over-all strategic doctrine".
^U. S. Navy, Financial Management In the Navy . NAVPERS
10792-A, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. 0., 1962, p. 9.
Frederick I. Nelson, "Decision-Making Controls in the
Department of Defense" (unpublished Master's thesis, The George
Washington University, 1964), p. 53*

5In 1953, the newly installed Elsenhower Administration was
to take a new view of the entire structure of defense. The shape
of changes to come were outlined by the Rockefeller Committee which
had intensively studied defense department organization before
making a report of recommended changes. This report became the
basis for Presidential Reorganization Plan No, 6 of 1953.
The Rockefeller Committee plan emphasized the need for
strengthening civilian control, for improved strategic planning,
and for effectiveness with economy. The administration's
Reorganization Plan showed where this strengthening should occur.
The intent of the President's request to Congress was plain: "No
function in any part of the Department of Defense or in any of its
component agencies is to be performed independent of the direction,
authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense."
Significant changes resulting from the 1953 reorganization
legislation were the addition of five more assistant secretaries,
reduction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the status of a military
staff agency, and elevation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as
a military advisor to the Secretary.
The Secretary of Defense gained authority from these
legislative changes. But once again it became obvious that the
^•Nelson A. Rockefeller, Report of the Rockefeller Committee
on Department of Defense Organization , Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Washington, D. C, April 1953.
%illlam R. Kintner, Forging a New Sword (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1958), p. 45.

6Secretary of Defense would share his authority. Restraints and
reservations required him to share his authority with Congress
itself since his strength was basically of a political nature. 1
After 1953, the Defense Department outwardly resembled the
ideal model of a hierarchial general staff organization. The
Secretary of Defense was at the top of the pyramid. Reporting to
him were nine Assistant Secretaries who had functional areas of
responsibility. Unified commands and the service departments were
beneath all these staff agencies on the chart. The flow of
authority and responsibility was vertical. Communications,
information, command and control converged on the office of the
secretary. Finally, the "reformers of Defense Department
organization" considered that the Secretary of Defense should be
in a position to "run" the Department. 2
Congress appeared content with their handiwork. Members
of this body could understand such a model organizational framework;
so could the military. Clear-cut lines of authority and of
responsibility were obvious, it seemed.
The 1953 reorganization created a general staff-type
structure but it was a general staff of a new type, one completely
unknown to the military. It had its own character: it was a
civilian general staff. Thus, a new dimension was added to the
complexities of defense organization.-^
^Rles, op. cit.. p. 163.
2Ibid., p. 164.
3 Ibid ., p. 165.

7Reorganization of the Defense Department. 1958 .—-Kith the
Korean War concluded In an uneasy peace, the horn of plenty of
military appropriations began to feel the administration's
"security with solvency" squeeze* Force levels and budgets became
prime concerns of the services. Manpower and budget ceilings were
drawn up by the President, the Bureau of the Budget, and the
Secretary of Defense. These were then handed to the Joint Chiefs
for allocation to the services and for establishment of force
levels. Defense ends (policy) became confused with means (budget
dollars and manpower). Allocation of funds was viewed as purely
a military problem to be easily solved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Further unification, greater centralization was urged by
many as a solution to defense problems. Proposals made by the
Eisenhower Administration would have had the effect of increased,
independent power for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; of
eliminating the "service leader ties to their respective services
of JCS members"; and of reducing the services to support activities
for the unified commands. *-
Congress accepted the basic reorganization proposals but
rejected some minor changes which tended to separate responsibility
from authority. The legislative changes in 1958 authorized a larger
1W. T. Bigger, "The Structural Organization of Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps, for -Planning, Programming, and Budgeting"
(unpublished thesis, Resident Course of the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C, April 17, 1959), P. 30.

8Joint Staff, delegation of some of the routine functions of the
Joint Chiefs, and made a change in language which effectively opened
the door for further centralization:
In the final version of the Act, (Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, U. S. Public Law
85-599), the Congress, at the suggestion of the
President, inserted "each Service shall be
separately organized -under its own Secretary and
shall function under the direction, authority, and
control of the Secretary of Defense". The words
"separately organized" are in lieu of "separately
administered" contained in the National Security Act
of 1947. 1
Centralization by 1958 was well enough established to bring
forth statements of caution from some Congressmen who were
toiowledgeable about defense affairs, Carl Vinson stated:
It was never intended, and is not now intended,
that the office of the Secretary of Defense would
become a fourth department within the Department of
Defense, delving into operational details on a daily
basis. The Secretary is supposed to make policy
• • • •
One additional change made by the reorganization provisions
of 1958 was significant. Assistant Secretaries of Defense were
authorized to issue orders directly to the military departments,
providing they had authorization in writing from the Secretary of
Defense. This new authority can be contrasted with the Assistant
Secretaries 1 initial status established in 1953 which provided that
^-Chester J. Butcher, "The Program Budget Control Concept-
Key to Management of the Department of Defense" (unpublished
Master's thesis, #6579, The George Washington University, Washington,
D. C, September, 1963), p, 63.
*U, S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report ,
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 . 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1958, H. R. No. 1765, p. 7.

9they would advise and assist the Secretary of Defense "without
imposing themselves into the direct lines of responsibility and
authority between the Secretary of Defense and the three military
departments . "-I-
Centralization and service rivalry.—The National Security
Act of 1947 as amended in 194-9, 1953, and 1958 fitted the familiar
historical pattern: "All defense organization proposals have
purported to bring about central control . And virtually every
specific change in defense structure has been defended as a means
to this end."
The impacts of centralization resulting from these
reorganizations were not to be capitalized upon fully until 1961
when this would be done by a new administration and by a new
Secretary of Defense. The period from 1958 to I960 was Just too
short to produce real results for the Republican Administration
because rivalry still divided the Department of Defense.
Centralization of authority in the office of the Secretary of
Defense did not, of Itself, guarantee coordination or cooperation
within the Department.
The public eye during the Elsenhower years had been focused
on interservice rivalry as the services scrambled for their fair
shares of the sharply reduced defense budgets. The competition
3-U. S., President, Message Accompanying Reorganization
Plan No. 6 of 1953. Relating to the Department of Defense . 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess., H. D. , 136, 1953, pp. 5-6.
2Ries, ot>. clt .. p. xiv.
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was keen and clearly apparent, but the objectives were not always
clear to the public, the Congress, nor indeed, to the competitors.
Political acumen, always a virtue for a service leader,
became a necessity for service advocacy and representation. This
phenomena occurred in spite of a policy statement of 1953 concerning
military leaders and politics
:
3asic decisions relating to the military forces
must be made by politically-accountable civilian
officials. Conversely, professional military leaders
must not be thrust into the political arena to become
the prey of partisan politics* 1
Thus rivalry and the pressures of service politics combined
to defeat or delay the main purpose of centralization—that of
allowing the Secretary of Defense to firmly guide defense efforts
by establishing policy and insuring that overall planning of the
services supported that policy.
^Kintner, op. cit.. p. 64, quoting from the President's
Message Accompanying Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. Relating
to the Department of Defense.

CHAPTER II
THE DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE PROGRAM SYSTEM
For many years, the individual military departments had
been making independent efforts to develop and utilize various
planning and programming techniques. The trend was toward develop-
ment of internal service-oriented programs which were seldom
reviewed, consolidated, or analyzed in a systematic manner at
Department of Defense level. The formal review of service programs
took place chiefly in conjunction with the annual budget review.
Background of the program approach.—After Robert S.
McUamara was appointed Secretary of Defense in 1961, he set about
developing a comprehensive system for planning and controlling
major military programs at the highest levels of the Department
of Defense. 3" Secretary McNamara did not feel that the military
force structure developed piecemeal through individual service
programs was such as to give the nation a well-balanced defense
capability throughout the spectrum of possibilities from nuclear
war to guerrilla subversion activities.
To achieve this position of balance required positive steps
to be taken by the Secretary to focus attention on the military
^U. S. Department of Defense, Programming System for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense . Study report prepared by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 31 May




missions involved in executing national policy. He needed a means
for classifying military activities of all services "in terms of
their missions, so that activities having similar missions could be
more easily combined for decision-making purposes. "^ The
programming structure that was developed under his direction to meet
these needs was the Department of Defense Program System.
Building the framework for the -program system.—The aims,
methodology, and the philosophy of programming were set forth in
The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age , by Charles <J. Hitch
and Roland N« McKean. 2 This book was written as part of Project
RAND, ^ the research program of RAND Corporation for the U. S. Air
Force, before co-author Hitch became Comptroller of the Department
of Defense in 1961. The administrative mechanisms to implement
the Department of Defense Program System were developed in Mr.
Hitch's office by his deputy for programming, Hugh McCullough,
after Hitch became Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
The new way of looking at defense problems which emerged
from the programming system was in part motivated by shortcomings
in the budget process 9 as seen by Secretary McNamara and Mr. Hitch.
1Ibid .
%obert J. Massey, "Program Packages and the Program Budget
in the Department of Defense, " Public Administration Review . March,
1963, p. 30.
^For a short history of RAND Corporation, see Editor's
Special Report: "Planners for the Pentagon," Business Week .
July 13, 1963. •
4-Massey, loc. cit .
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The annual defense budget, traditionally the vehicle for
allocation of resources and for achieving balance in the nation's
military forces, is built along functional lines. Congress uses
the functional categories of military personnel, operation and
maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military
construction in appropriating and controlling the use of public
funds by the military. But, according to Mr. Hitch, these
functional categories did not "focus on the key decision-making
areas which were of principal concern to top management in the
Defense Department." These 3cey decision-areas are those involved
in force level determination and weapons systems selection.
The economics of choice and military decisions .—The basic
thesis of The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age is that
major military decisions, the decisions concerning forces and
weapons systems, are in reality economic decisions. As economic
decisions, they revolve around the objective of getting maximum
return per unit of investment or resource utilization in an
environment of resource scarcity.
The object of applying economic criteria to military
decisions is to insure consideration of costs and effectiveness
of alternative systems so that choices (decisions) may be made that
tend to maximize the overall military strength of the nation from
any given level of resources applied or utilized.
^Charles J. Hitch, "Management of the Defense Dollar," XI,
The Pederal^AcojDuntant, June, 1962, p. 34.

14
The first element of the problem Is essentially
one of choosing doctrines, forces and equipment to
get the most defense out of any given level of
resources. In this respect, it is essentially a
problem of economic choice—of relating military
worth or effectiveness of alternative ways of
achieving specific, well-defined national security
objectives to their respective costs in terms of
resources.-*-
Resource scarcity is an economic fact of life; this makes
choices between alternative systems necessary. All resources are
limited to a degree. Some are convertible; some are direct
substitutes for others. Conversion or substitution, however,
requires surpluses, appropriate knowledge, and sufficient manpower
and time. Such conversion or substitution is likely to create new
shortages in the other types of resources .^
Thus every resource allocation to one area or selected
alternative may be measured by what of necessity is given up in
other areas. A classic example of this allocation-sacrifice is
the simplified comparison made by former President Dwight D.
Sisenhower
:
The cost of one modern bomber is this: a
modern brick school in more than thirty cities;
it is two electric power plants, each serving a
town of 60,000 population; it is two fine, fully
equipped hospitals; it is some 50 miles of
concrete highway. J
J-Ibld., p. 33.
2Luther Gulick, Administrative Reflections from World
War II (Brimingham: University of Alabama, 1948), pp. 24-26.
'Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Chance for Peace," an address




There is no escaping the necessity of choice. Such choice
in economic terms must be made by considering costs in relation to
benefits. This implies evaluation and comparison of alternatives
to some predetermined standard of merit or scale of values.
Economic analysis of alternatives through cost-benefit
(cost-effectiveness) computations offered an aid to decision-
making in other government agencies before advocacy for their
application to military decisions was well publicized. Jesse
Burkhead comments that costs and benefits of similar programs
within an agency can be meaningfully compared as an aid to
establishing benefit-cost ratios. Notwithstanding difficulty in
definition of primary, secondary, intangible, and future benefits
and in application of procedures, these measurements can
contribute to more effective appraisal of programs within an
agency or department.
Such cost-effectiveness analysis has become the under-
lying base for decision-making in the Department of Defense since
the advent of the Department of Defense Program System. The
designers of the system, however, insist that such economic
analysis (i.e., cost-effectiveness) is but one way of looking at
-Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1956), i?^. 250-251.
2Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
i960) See pp. 118-119 for discussion of appropriate economic
criteria and the elements of military choice.
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military decisions in an environment of uncertainty. Further, it
is readily declared that such analysis should concern peacetime,
not wartime, costs, National security in peacetime is the object
of concern:
The major economic problem is to maximize the
capability of forces in being by using resources
efficiently before the war starts—so efficiently
that we hope an enemy will never dare start it .*
A requirement for reorientation.—Modern weapons systems
are complex and costly and require lengthy periods to develop.
They have come to be the key decisions around which much else of
the Defense program revolves. Decision-making at top Defense
levels required extensive data concerning these weapons systems
and the forces which are to employ them. These data were required
in a form of costs of weapons systems related to effectiveness in
terms of missions. Data in this form, according to Mr. Hitch,
could not be provided "by the existing financial systems of the
services
:
It was dear to us, therefore, that the
existing financial management system would have
to be reorionted and restructured if it was to
provide the data needed by top Defense managers
to make the really crucial decisions.
3
These "really crucial decisions" which determine overall
TJ. S. military power and balance are those which specify the force
"Ibid
. , p. v.
2Ibid ., p. 170.
^Hitch, "Management of the Defense Dollar," op. clt ». p. 35.
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levels, deployment, and composition over time of all military
units. The purpose of Department of Defense programming is to
"aggregate these units in a manner which is meaningful and
convenient for top-level decision making."
Major programs and program elements .--The Department of
Defense program system consists of nine major programs oriented
around given military missions or sets of related purposes.
Four programs have missions which are explained by their
titles: Strategic Retaliatory Forces, Continental Air and Missile
Defense Forces, General Purpose (conventional war) Forces, and
the Airlift and Sealift Forces. Three others are primarily
supporting programs: Reserve and Guard Forces, Research and
Development program, and General Support (an all-others category).
The last two major programs are Civil Defense and Military
Assistance programs. Naval forces are not included in these
latter two. 2
Bach major program is a grouping of program elements.
These program elements are defined as integrated activities-
combinations of men, equipment, and Installations whose effective-
ness can be related to national security objectives.^ These
^DOD Study Report, op. clt ., p. II-l.
2U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller,
Program Change^Control_System in the Department of the Navy .
NAVESOS P-2£l£,"' August, "19^2, Appendix C. This reference cited
hereafter as NAVEXOS P-2416.
Ibid.
, pp. 2-3, 2-4. A listing of programs in which the
U. S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps participate and a listing of the
applicable program elements appear in Appendix C, pp. 0-1 to C-7.
A list of program elements in the Department of Defense Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Program to which Marine Corps
resources are charged is shown in the Appendix to this paper.
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elements In the original programming format were grouped into sub-
program aggregations, either because they served each other or a
common mission, and were referred to as "program packages." This
phraseology has been used frequently by early writers on the
subject but is no longer in general or official use; the term
"programs" now denotes aggregations of elements. An illustration
using the current terminology would show that an Aircraft Carrier,
CVA-Forrestal Class, would be an element within the program
(aggregation) called Attack Carrier Strike Forces which is a part
of the major Program III—General Purpose Forces.
The basic make-up of elements, programs, and forces was
established on a "one-time determination" in 1961. Necessary
changes are made relative to this base classification. This base
is called the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program
(FYFS&FP) and is constituted of all approved programs of the
Department of Defense, arrayed over five successive operating
years. Changes to the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program are made through documentation processes called Program
Change Proposals (PCP's) which undergo critical analysis and
review at all levels, with final approval authority resting with
the Secretary of Defense.
The Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program






Only approved programs, fully costed in terms of research and
development costs, Initial Investment costs, and projected
operating costs for a period of five years, go into the Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Program. -* Changes to existing
programs and program elements, once approved, enter the Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Program where other programs or
elements are adjusted as required by the change*
Major goals and features of the system.—»Ma.1 or objectives
of the Department of Defense programming system at its inception
3were iJ
1. To plan programs around major missions
rather than Servioes.
2. To relate resources—manpower, materiel,
equipment and the like—to military output.
3* To coordinate long range planning with
budgeting*
4. To appraise programs on a continuous
basis.
5. To control approved programs through timely
progress reports.
6. To provide a capability for making cost-
effectiveness studies of alternative force
structures.
7* To integrate OSD information systems in
order to avoid duplication.
iThe definition of "cost" most useful for programming
purposes is total obligational authority (TOA). TOA is defined
as the "total amount of funds available for programming in a
given year, regardless of the year the funds are appropriated,
obligated or expended." DOD Study Report, op. olt .. p. II-4 and
II-5.
%AVEX0S P-2416, op. clt .. pp. 4-1, 4-2.
^Ibid ., p. ill.
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Accomplishment of these objectives was to lead to
providing more and better information for decision-making
purposes to the Secretary of Defense by combining existing
information channels into one channel: the program system.
Review of service proposals was to be timely and continuous to
ensure that decisions were made in light of future efforts and
overall defense requirements, a3 opposed to individual service
orientation. Reporting systems were incorporated in the program
system to provide physical progress reporting and resource
accounting information to support the data requirement and to
measure progress against plans.
Post categories and computations .—»The overall requirement
at Department of Defense level for financial information was put
into specific requirements which were provided by the services and
departments within the framework of the program system.
To permit cost-effectiveness studies and to allow analysis
of the full impact of all programs, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense specified that the cost of each element would be
submitted by the services on their respective elements of various
programs. These costs were submitted to cover five year periods
and were broken down in several ways
:
1. By total obligational authority and
expenditures.
2. By appropriation account and budget title,
in line with the present budget structure.
3. By the three broad categories of costs-
research and development, investment, and operation.
iNAVEXOS P-2416, op. cit .. p. 2-9.
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Ideally, these costs would be most useful if computed and
projected over the entire life 3pan of a weapons system, but,
because of the difficulty of making such long-term projections
with any degree of precision, a five year period of projection was
decided upon. This length of period, according to Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Hitch, is "short enough to make
possible reasonably accurate estimates and long enough to provide
a good approximation of the full cost. This decision provided
the time frame of the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program, the programming systems 1 document.
The entire complex of programming—the Five Tear Force
Structure and Financial Program, Program Change Proposals, and
associated progress reports--appears to rest on measurements of
cost-effectiveness (costs of research and development, investment,
and operation of a system in relation to a measure of effectiveness
of contribution to basic national security objectives). Although
the calculations of cost-effectiveness measurements undoubtedly
are Involved and difficult, the basic questions behind the
mathematics are relatively simple:
First—what is the most economical, therefore, the most
efficient, 2 way of accomplishing a given task or gaining a
capability?
•^Hitch, "Management of the Defense Dollar," op, cit .. p.35»
Hitch and McKean, op. cit ., p, 3.
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Second—what must be sacrificed to acquire this capability
or to accomplish the given task?
The end result of unbiased analysis of these two major
questions should result in an array of alternatives, each with
some measure of oost-effectiveness. The ultimate choice of
programs or approval of program changes remains an amalgam of
calculations, expertise, experience, and Judgment.
Upon approval of a program change, regardless of the
weights given to the selection criteria, it enters the Plve Year
Force Structure and Finanoial Program where its phased increments
become useful for annual budget preparation. This "improved"
relationship between approved programs and annual budget requests
was a prime reason for establishing the program system.
Relationships between programming: and budgeting . --The
principal vehicle for allocating resources, for achieving a
"balanced" output from the military establishment as an entity,
has traditionally been the annual budget process. However, the
annual budget has limitations for the "balancing task" in the
modern military environment. Where major weapons systems have
such enormous costs and long lead-times for development, and where
the budget is built along functional lines, it is difficult to
relate cost inputs with military outputs. 2
iNATOCOS P-2416, op, clt .. p. 1-1.
2Massey, op. clt .. p. 31.
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Apparently aware of this limitation, the designers of the
Department of Defense programming system sought to use the tools
and techniques of economics and financial management outside the
confines, the constraints, of the annual budgetary process.
It is now recognized that budget decisions are by their
very nature program decisions as well. But the reverse is not
necessarily so in the annual budget process. Programming was to
be an attempt to make program decisions evolve into budget
decisions : "Ideally a decision to embark upon a program should be
a specific decision to include the funds to carry it out in the
budget as submitted by the Department of Defense."2
Those who developed the program system point out that
program review is not intended to replace budget review or to be
a substitute for such review. The intention is that approved
programs in the Pive Year Force Structure and Financial Program
3
would provide the base for preparation of the annual budget.
Under the program system, program review is a continuous
process. Therefore it should be possible, at any point in time,
to develop an annual budget by using the first year increments of
4
the approved programs as the budget base.
1Ibid.
2Ibid ., quoting remarks of Charles J. Hitch.




The potential of programming.—This approach to decision-
making in the Department of Defense through the use of tools and
concepts of economic analysis seemed to hold great promise in the
eyes of Secretary of Defense McNamara early in his tenure. What
the Secretary of Defense expected from the programming system was
well expressed by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Hitch in his statement before the Jackson Subcommittee where he
appraised the potential of programming in these words:
These improvements, of themselves, will not make
the hard decisions easy, nor will they make simple
the complex problem of formulating national defense
policy. What they will do, we hope, is facilitate
the rational analysis of national security problems.
They will make us aware of the full cost implications
of the choices we make. They will permit us, in
shorter time and with greater accuracy, to oost out
,
the various polioy alternatives presented to the
National Security Council for its consideration. I
feel very strongly that whether one is choosing among
particular items of equipment or among various policy
proposals, it is extremely useful to array explicitly
the alternatives and their respective costs and
effectiveness. The procedures we are developing will
promote this way of looking at our defense problems,
this way of deciding how best to defend the security
of the United States.
^
Pour years 1 experience with the Department of Defense
program system has shown that with its potential and strengths
have come certain weaknesses, shortcomings, and problem areas.
Chapter III contains some current observations concerning the
program system and its implications.
lu. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Organizing for National Security; The Budget and the Policy Process ,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery




SOME OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OP THE PROGRAM SYSTEM
The management thought which is reflected by the
Department of Defense program system might well be related to two
ideas developed by Luther Gulick in his summary of administrative
lessons to be learned from World War II:
/l/ A clear statement of purpose in terms of
time, resources, and interrelations is the out-
standing guarantee of effective administration.
/2/ The translation from purpose to program
is the crucial step in administration, a process
which involves the identification of the key
controllable elements in a given situation and then
the sure manipulation of those few keys.^
The Department of Defense program system has a clear
statement of purpose to develop an instrument of national policy
which is responsive to centralized control. Its structure is
built in terms of resources and interrelations in a specific time
frame in the form of the Five Year Porce Structure and Financial
Program. Key controllable elements have been identified in terms
of availability, capability and costs. The "sure manipulation of
those few keys" remains the determinant of the responsiveness of
the system as a management device.




This conceptual basis of the program system embraces the
proposition of centralized decision-making with decentralized
execution of these decisions. This continuation of the trend noted
earlier toward centralization of decision-making in the office and
person of the Secretary of Defense has been rapidly accelerated by
the operation of the program system.
As a consequence of the implications which are inherent in
its use, the Department of Defense program system seems to be
characteristically evaluated (at least by persons in the military
environment) with reservations as to either the "economic
rationale" on which it is based, or to the "ultimate consequences
of centralization." Such reservations tend to result in a great
number of critics of the program system. Even those who support
both the rationale and the tendency toward centralization can find
fault with the mechanics of the system's application or with
detailed procedures of its operation.
General observations . 2—The program system routinely
provides the Secretary of Defense with more Information for
iThese expressions, in varying forms, were read and heard
several times during the period of study and research for this
paper.
^The comments concerning the strengths, weaknesses, and
implications of the DOD program system were collected during the
research from various individuals who work with the program
processes related to their positions of responsibility within the
Department of the Navy. Their viewpoints are presented more with
an intention to give a "feel and flavor" for the system than to





decision-making than he ever had before 1961. This greatly
accelerated flow of data is being used to communicate more
readily, more meaningfully, between the military departments, the
Joint Chiefs, and the offices of the Secretary of Defense. 1 The
program system has added a new and important dimension to
integrated planning, coordination, and control of the vast Defense
complex.
One of the most notable advantages of the system f s
operation seems to be its way of forcing consideration of
alternatives which might otherwise not be considered. 2 In this
regard, service response to the system's detailed requirements
apparently gives a measure of direction to planning efforts which
was not evident before the advent of the program system:
We started out to meet Department of Defense
requirements, per so. By now, the system is so
firmly embedded that it will outlive the present
Secretary of Defense. And it should. It imposes
a badly needed discipline on internal planning
and programming.
3
1Interview with Lt Ool Marvin D. VolKert, U. S. Marine
Corps, Plans and Review Section, Budget Branch, Fiscal Division,
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. 0., February 18, 1965.
2Interview with Major R. J. Lynch, U. S. Marine Corps,
Plans and Review Section, Budget Branch, Fiscal Division,
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D. C, September 25, 1964.
^Richard G. Shutt, Captain, U. S. Navy, Director of Navy
Program Information Center. Presentation for the Navy Graduate
Financial Management Program at The George Washington University,
November 30, 1964. Captain Shutt f s presentation was very helpful




Generalizations about the program system as a management
tool were found to be favorable concerning the economic approach
used, but unfavorable concerning the detailed administrative
procedures and workload which accompanies program maintenance.
Once the rationale of considering "military decisions as economic
decisions" is fully understood, its value as "a way of looking
at military problems" seems more likely to be appreciated.
Economic analyses and cost-effectiveness studies conducted in
response to requirements for justification have proved beneficial,
in spite of the necessity to estimate some of the inputs in vqxj
broad terms.
Any summary of strengths of the program system might
involve a comparison of original goals and those which have now
been realized except that several of the original goals were
long-term propositions. It is unlikely that these long-term
goals oould be fairly appraised after only four years 1 experience
with the program system. Significant accomplishments have,
however, been realized in reporting and program appraisal.
Basically, the objectives of the system seem realistic and
attainable over time despite some serious handicaps pointed up by
2
critics of the system.
^• Ibld .
p
Fred D. Bennett, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant
Comptroller and Director of Budgets and Reports, Department of
the Navy, "Role of the Budget Officer." Presentation for the Navy
Graduate Financial Management Program at The George Washington
University, October 26, 1964.
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Observations of weaknesses . --The program system does have
shortcomings and retains certain weaknesses despite continuing
efforts to eliminate them„
The first of these, and seemingly foremost in the minds
of many critics of the system, is the fact that the Department of
Defense program system "imposed a massive river of paper" upon
already overloaded administrative channels, resulting in "super-
saturated workloads." The stringent demands for additional data
gave rise to "reporting systems which grew like Topsy in a frantic
p
effort to meet the requirements and to expand the data base."
Another weakness, which is not visible to the casual
observer of the system's operation, nor to the reader of much of
the published work concerning the program system, seems to
indicate a failure to meet a principal goal of the system: "The
greatest weakness of the present Department of Defense program
system is that budgeting is not yet in line with programming; the
two are not properly tied together."^
^Shutt, loo, cit .
2Morris A. Hlrsch, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Deputy
Comptroller, Department of the Navy. Presentation for the Navy
Graduate Financial Management Program at The George Washington
University, February 11, 1965.
3john K. Leydon, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval
Research. Presentation for the Navy Graduate Financial




Further, it appears that no revision of program or budget
processes is to be directed from the offioes of the Secretary of
Defense to complete the "bridge between plans and budgets."
This pressure will apparently have to come from the individual
services upward in order to synthesize the budget/programming
system in the future.
Another shortcoming of the program system, when
considered from an individual service viewpoint, is that the
system offers little, if any, internal management support for the
individual service. The system is oriented toward overall
Defense Department management needs alone. This results in the
program system being super-imposed on existing management systems
of the services without contributing to the support of these
systems
:
We do not and cannot manage the Navy in DOD
program terms. . . . First, because the program
element concept is too big for internal management;
second, there is no great savings indicated by
"switching"; finally, we have historically managed,
and are familiar with, appropriation terms. 2
Although translation of data between service programs,
appropriation terms, and Department of Defense program terms is
possible, such translation at present is costly, time-consuming,
and subject to error in the process. Automatic data processing
of program information has lessened the effects of, but not
eliminated, this weakness.
1Ibid .
2Shutt, loc. cit .
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Certain improvements have been made, or are underway,
to eliminate or reduce the impact cf these procedural weaknesses in
the program system, 1 Other weaknesses appear to exist, however,
which are more of a philosophical nature and for which no solution
seems apparent at present.
The first of these revolves around the tendency of the
program approach to Justify more requirements of the services than
were possible before such system was used. Prom the viewpoint of
an individual service, it would seem inconsistent to call this a
weakness or a disadvantage. But at least one service leader sees
it that way: "One weakness in the program system seems to be that
it 'smacks 1 of a Letter-to-Santa Olaus approach; the overriding
tendency is to drive upward."
This disadvantage becomes more obvious if one considers
that a Defense budget request, carefully worked out through
economic analysis and selection of alternatives, can be summarily
cut by the Congress "across the board" as being simply "too big."
This is not a new phenomenon, but should this happen to a budget
created through the program process, serious doubts could be
entertained about the validity of the "balancing" premise of the
basic programming approach which builds on incremental changes,
rather than "across the board" changes or revisions.
^NAVEXOS P-2416 provides a summary of improvements under-
taken by the Department of the Navy. See footnote 2, page 17.
2Bennett, loc. oit .
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Finally, the program system of the Department of Defense
appears to have built into its structure more than the usual
amount of inflexibility which Albers says inherently accompanies
any planning process. 1 Operating decisions in the Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Program are concerned with incremental,
rather than complete changes and thus fit the classical planning
model where "yesterday's decisions impose a high degree of
inflexibility upon tomorrow's plans and decisions." This would
seem to be especially worthy of note in a planning process
extension such as the program system where decisions result from
detailed data, are carefully analyzed, and are carefully
documented. Flexibility is provided by the program change
proposal system, but this, too, is sufficiently detailed and
complicated so as to reduce recommended changes to minimums,
consistent with operational adequacy.
Identification of problem areas .—-Several aspects of the
Department of Defense program system do not lend themselves to
categorization as strengths or as weaknesses. These are the
"gray areas" that have developed from routine operation of the
system since its introduction in the Department of Defense. Four
such problem areas involving thresholds and ceilings, interservice
coordination, costs breakout and cost correlation, and resource
^Henry H. Albers, Organized Executive Action (New York:




distribution among major programs will "be introduced in this
section. Coverage in depth of these areas will not be attempted
nor will it be implied that these are the only, or even the most
important, of the many "gray areas" surrounding the program system.
One criticism often heard during this research effort was
that "management of manpower and all other resources rests in the
hands of the Secretary of Defense, or his deputy, since they alone
can approve Program Change Proposals (PCPs ) . " Although approval
authority is retained by the Secretary, interpretation is
necessary before weighing the criticism since the system was
designed to bring significant changes to the personal attention of
the Secretary for his approval. Presumably minor changes, and
those outside the program system parameters, could be made without
higher approval: "She Program Change Control System does not alter
approval requirements and operating procedures of a specialized
nature such as • • , manpower changes within authorized
departmental ceilings,"
Manpower ceilings and "threshold oriteria" (various
established maximum ranges of change within which no formal Program
Change Proposal submission is required) allow the military
departments and services some leeway for managing in accord with
individual service needs. The thresholds are set very low in some
cases, however. Por example, any new program element, regardless





of dollar amounts Involved, exceeds present threshold criteria,
as does any change affecting total authorized year-end manpower
spaces. 1 Thus established thresholds severely limit service
freedom in decision-making without reference to higher authority,
Further, the threshold criteria are subject to change by the
office of the Secretary of Defense and can be raised or lowered
as necessary to maintain central control of program procedures.
An "above threshold" change requires compliance with the
formalities of the Program Change Proposal submission and
illustrates the tremendous amount of interservice coordination that
is required by the system. For instance, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, as a program sponsor, must coordinate with from
eight to ten interested Navy bureau and department heads, plus
his own headquarters staff, when making certain program changes.
These bureaus and offices Include: Bureau of Yards and Docks, if
facilities are involved; Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for
medical records and provisions; Bureau of Naval Personnel for any
Navy personnel affected; Bureau of Supplies and Aocounts for
general stores; Bureau of Ships for ground supplies; Bureau of
Yfeapons for ground electronics; and with several offices of the
Chief of Naval Operations, e. g. : with "OP-01" for personnel
guidance; with "OP-04" for handling equipment; with "OP-05" for
aircraft assignment; and, finally, with perhaps "OP-07", if




aircraft systems improvement is involved.
Despite the coordination that is demanded and despite the
detailed input to the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program, discrepancies apparently do get into, and remain in, the
projections of the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program,
There seems to be a gap of some proportion between the Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Program and the obligations created
under the programming, The size and definition of this gap is
not too clear at present. By 1970, perhaps earlier, correlation
audit will reveal the true nature and extent of this apparent
gap. 2
In a similar vein, it seems that accounting systems are
unable to create cost inputs which are acceptably reliable and
consistent with the needs of the program system. Only in a
"clean" program element, such as Polaris, can costs be broken out
with any validity. All accounting systems are not yet tied in
effectively with the program system,-'
The final problem area to be mentioned here is that of
4distribution of service resources among the major programs.
^hutt, loc, cit .
2Ibid.
3lbld .
4-See NAVEXOS P-2416, op, cit .. Appendix 0, for overall
distribution of Navy and Marine Corps elements and programs.
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Where the majority of total service participation is heavily-
weighted toward one or another of tho major programs, significant
questions can be asked concerning the manner in which service
participation in the remainder of the programs is accounted for.
The nature of this problem can best be illustrated by the
following example:
Distribution of FY 65 Navy resources among the
major programs gives some food for thought. Program
VII—General Support—utilized twenty per cent (20)2
)
of the Navy dollars and thirty-two per cent (32%) of
its people in what is substantially an "overhead or












aIotals will not add because percentages are
rounded.
Thus, sixty per cent (60$) of our Navy "eggs" are
in Basket III. Is it worthwhile to measure. and account
for the others in such detail as is now required?
Further, how effective is the program system that
in effeot "excludes" consideration of, or lumps, twenty
per cent (20$) of our dollars and thirty-two per cent
(32$) of our personnel as "overhead"? . . . Would it
be useful to further define this twenty and thirty-two
per cent? ... Would it be economically feasible to
do so?1 •
^hutt, loo, clt . This was a blackboard exercise with
commentary by Captain Shutt.
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There are no ready answers for these questions nor are
there easy solutions to the problem areas just presented. One
problem area created by the program system does, however, appear
more sharply controversial than any of the others and is deserving
of special attention, even though it was treated in general terms
earlier in this paper. This area is that of centralization of
power in the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the
implications of this centralization for the military services.
Centralization and its implications .—Hearings before the
Jackson Subcommittee on national Policy Machinery in 1961^-
explored the "likely implications" of the newly installed program
p
concept and its oonsequences for defense policy. A comment by
Aaron Wildavsky seems to sum up the ultimate outcome of the
program concept: "The most significant result . . . may turn out
to be the increased power it gives to the Secretary of Defense-.
Genuine concern is developing within military circles
against this greater concentration of power in the Secretary of
Defense. "Single service" suspicions have not yet been laid to
rest nor have the opponents of centralization been silenced. In
lu. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Hearings .
Organizing for National Security. The Budget and the Policy
Process (Jackson Subcommittee), oTth Congress, 1st Session, 1961. .
^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1964), p. 139.




January, 1965, the President of the Marine Corps Reserve Officers'
Association spoke out against this trend:
It would appear to me, as your National
President, that we must face the fact that the
Secretary of Defense, whether we agree with him or
not, is determined to bring about an absolute
merger of the armed forces of this country into a
single service headed by a single service chief and
by a single civilian head in the form of a Secretary
of Defense. This is a position which MCROA has
opposed slnoe the end of World War II. This is a
position which appears destructive of the
constitutional form of government in this country
as related to the Armed Services. It is a position
which could eventually lead to the destruction of
our country as it has to all others which have
adopted this system. I think we all must band
together to oppose this continuing erosion of the
separate services.
*
There appears to be little doubt but that centralization
of defense management was intended to be accomplished by the
program system and that suoh centralization is a reality.
Unilateral service determination of service requirements has been
o
greatly circumscribed for Fiscal Year 1966. The uniformity of
service programming resulting from central direction and the
increasing use of electronic computers to aid data collection and
decision making at Department of Defense level tend to accelerate
such centralization. The limits to which centralization will go
within the Department of Defense are still in doubt. An offspring
^-Arthur B. Hanson, National President, Marine Corps
Reserve Officers' Association (MCROA). Letter to members of
MCROA, dated 18 January 1965.
p
Bennett, loc. clt .
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of the programming system is the functional area review (e. g.,
command, control, communication) which is considered by the
Offices of the Secretary of Defense as being a "natural evolution
of the program system.
"
Yfhether centralized control and direction are a natural
evolution or not avoids the major issue. The crucial question
seems to be this: is centralized direction necessary to accomplish
the mission of the Department of Defense? The answer to this
question depends in turn on whether or not centralized planning
is necessary from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Granting
that central planning is necessary from this office insures that
centralized direction will follow. Whenever authority for routine
decision-making or operations is decentralized, greater emphasis
is placed on the need for feedback as a measure of performance and
conformance. Such surveillance provides a basis for central
control or redirection of action. Planning is of little value
unless there is a provision for control to give a degree of
o
certainty to the fulfillment of the planned action.
The trend toward increasing centralization is obvious.
Service officials have directed words of caution to their own
servioes concerning the consequences of failing to recognize the
trend. One such example seems to infer the inevitable acceleration
^hutt, loc. clt .
2John P. Hee, Management Thought in a Dynamic Economy
(New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 67.
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of the trend: "As things "become more centralized, it becomes
apparent to me that, if we want to participate in molding policies,
we must get in early, on the ground floor, as active
participants--not as passive recipients of policy already made."
Many believe that not only will centralization continue
and accelerate, but also that the present philosophy underlying
the program system will perpetuate itself: "The present program
system is but a beginning; 1961 to 1964 is only a primer for this
way of looking at and thinking about the military decision
processes.
Even as a "beginning, " the program system has had
significant impacts on the Department of Defense and on the
individual military services. This overview of programming will
serve as background for consideration of some effects of the
program system on the Marine Corps that are explored in Chapter V,
while Chapter IV will review planning and programming as conducted
by the Marine Corps before introduction of the Department of
Defense program system.
iHirsch, loc. cit .
2Leydon, loc. cit .

CHAPTER IV
MARINE CORPS PLACING AND PROGRAMMING, I960
Defense policy-mating was becoming more centralized prior
to I960, but plans and programs of the services for attaining
objectives were still generally single-service oriented. Planning
and programming was mainly developed independently by the
Individual services, except for the service plans oriented toward
support of war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Planning done by the Marine Corps was an exception to the
general rule of "independent planning." The necessity existed
for coordination of Marine Corps plans with those of the Navy
because of the unique position of the Marine Corps within the
Department of the Navy and its requirements for naval support in
executing the amphibious warfare mission.
The official reference for planning and programming in
the Marine Corps in I960 was the U. S. Marine Corps Planning and
Programming Manual . NAVMC P-2518, first published on 24 April
1959. The U. S. Marine Corps Planning and Programming Manual
lln October, 1961, this manual was incorporated into the
Marine Corps Directives System as Marine Corps Order P-3121.1. In
1962, it was revised and published as Marine Corps Order P-3121.1A.
In January, 1965, a further revision of the Marine Corps Manual
for Planning and Programming was published as Headquarters Order




(MOO P-3121.1) was published for the Information, guidance, and
compliance of all concerned with Marine Corps planning. This
manual set forth the relationships of Marine Corps plans and
programs to the budget cycle and to the plans and documents of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief
of Naval Operations.
The procedures concerning the related functions of
budgeting, funding, and procurement were briefly discussed at
appropriate points in the manual to clarify their relationship
to planning and programming. As an official directive of that
period, the U. S. Marine Corps Planning: and Programming; Manual .
NAVMC P-2518, 1959 (MCO P-3121.1), represented the Marine Corps
2
policies and procedures in effect from 1959 until 1961.
Service plans. I960 .—Marine Corps service plans indicated
the forces required for war and the support these forces required.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps was responsible for determining
the nature and extent of such required support for his service.
Other services were to provide required assistance in meeting
requirements by furnishing personnel, materiel, facilities, and
iThe original 1959 manual will be cited hereafter as
MOO P-3121.1; the revised 1962 manual as MCO P-3121.1A; the 1965
manual as HQO P-3121.2.
2The factual material in this section is based on or taken
from MCO P-3121.1, the original 1959 manual. The assumption is
made that written policies and procedures were executed and
enforced as written in this manual since no evidence to the




services. Such, plans were designed to develop detailed require-
ments
,
phased in time, for personnel, materiel, facilities, and
servioes. Generally they consisted of three parts: (1) Troop
(or force) plan, (2) Manpower plan, (3) Materiel plan (which
included facilities).
Service plans of the Marine Corps were prepared to reflect
capabilities or objectives, to show service requirements, or to
provide guidance to subordinate commands. All plans were oriented
to serve announoed national policy goals and to support war plans
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Marine Corps support of Joint Chiefs of Staff planning:.—
Since 1952, when the Joint Chiefs adopted the Joint Program for
Planning, three Joint strategic documents have been prepared each
year. These covered three separate but related time periods.
These documents were the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate
(JLESE), the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), and the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
These Joint documents were the basis for preparation of
service plans, estimates and programs covering the same time
periods as the related Joint plan. All such plans, Joint and
service, were revised each year. The Marine Corps participated in
all three Joint plans by submitting necessary information and data
^U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Program for Planning . Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat,
Washington, D. C, July 27, 1955.
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for consideration and inclusion in each Joint plan directly to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The service plans of the Marine Corps supported strategic
war plans of the Joint Chiefs. These supporting plans were: the
Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP), which supported the Joint Long
Range Strategic Estimate; the Marine Corps Objectives Plan (MOP),
which supported the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan; and the Marine
Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP), which supported the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan. The Marine Corps prepared these plans based on
the latest approved Joint Chiefs of Staff plans, guidance from
higher authority, and its own assumptions.
Marine Corps participation in the U. S. Navy Planning
System .—The Navy Planning System promulgated by OPNAV INSTRUCTION
5000. 19A provided for the development of Navy service plans and
programs, as well as for Departmental level plans and programs.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps participated in certain aspects
of the Navy service plans and in all aspects of the Departmental
planning
•
Navy service plans in which the Marine Corps participated
in I960 were
:
1. Navy Long Range Requirements (NLRR).
2. Navy Long Range Objectives (NLRO).
3. Navy Objectives Plan—Fiscal Year (NOP).
4. Navy Capabilities Plan (NOP).
5. Navy Logistics Capabilities Plan (NLCP).
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Department of the Navy plans in which the Marine Corps
participated in I960 were the Department of the Navy Annual
Program Objectives and the Basic Naval Establishment Plan. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps prepared the Marine Corps' portion
of these plans and submitted them to the Chief of Naval Operations
and to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, respectively, for the
approval of the Secretary of the Navy. The relationships of
Marine Corps plans with Navy service plans and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff plans in I960 are shown in Figure 1.
Responsibilities for Marine Corps planning .—Final
responsibility for Marine Corps planning rests with the Commandant
of the Marine Corps. With the assistance of the Deputy Chief of
Staff (Plans) and the Deputy Chief of Staff (Research and
Development), the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps directed the
development and execution of Marine Corps plans in I960. In this
effort, he was further assisted by the Marine Corps Planning and
Programming Committee consisting of the following officers:
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans), Chairman
Deputy Chief of Staff (Research and Development)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l t
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Director of Aviation
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(Covered single fiscal year.)
Source: Adapted from U. S. Marine Corps Planning and Programming
Manual (MOO P-3121.1, 1959).
Figure 1. --Relationships between Marine Corps and Navy





This committee was formed to insure coordination within
Headquarters, Marine Corps, (HQMO), of service and departmental
plans; to review and coordinate programs, program directives, and
policy for subsequent fiscal years (or those relating to major
reprogrammlng during the current year); and to make recommendations
on program objectives, programs and polioy as a basis for
preparation of the annual budget directive for each fiscal year.
Long range -planning, I960 ,—Long range planning was
directed toward the weapons and strategies of the future. It
purported to translate national policy into military strategy to
provide guidance for the orderly development of military resources
and for research and development purposes. The Joint Long Range
Strategic Estimate established only in a general way the type of
war expected and the basic undertakings required in the interim
period.
The supporting long range plans of the services were
viewed very flexibly:
Approval of the Marine Corps Long Range Plan
is not a predetermination of action in the long
range future; rather, the plan's estimate of the
future is useful, not as a guide..to future action,
but as guide to current actions.
The Marine Corps Long Range Plan was designed to set forth
broad indications of Marine Corps requirements (beginning eight'
^MOO P-3121.1, p. 3-4.
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years after publication), guidelines for research and development,
concepts of modern amphibious operations and for advanced bases,
and desirable long range posture and deployments.
Mid-range planning . —Mid-range planning of the Marine
Corps at this time was designed to translate long range plans into
reasonably obtainable objectives and programs as guide for current
action. Mid-range objectives were developed to provide guidance
on views and recommendations concerning the Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan (JSOP) and to provide necessary guides to
programming efforts to assure orderly progression of approved
programs toward predetermined objectives. Development of mid-
range objectives required consideration of broad concepts for
general and limited war, employment and deployment of Marine
Corps forces, force structures, manning levels, mobilization,
reserves, facilities, and research and development programs.
The Marine Corps mid-range plan, called the Marine Corps
Objectives Plan (MOP), was prepared for a three-year period
(commencing five years after publication) and was designed to
support the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP).
Basically, this service plan was to provide: (l) an optimum
force structure and deployment of Marine Corps forces to support
strategy outlined in JSOP, (2) training and support requirements
for Marine Corps forces, and (3) mobilization policies and
procedures to be implemented by the Marine Corps under the




.--The short range plan (single fiscal
year) of the Marine Corps in I960, which supported the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSOP) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
was the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP).
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan of the Joint Chiefs
included information, strategic and logistic guidance, and tasks
which were applicable during the year of the plan. On this,
unified and specified commanders and the services prepared their
supporting plans.
The Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP), in support of
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSOP), presented current
and anticipated assignments of actual, available Marine Corps
forces and resources which were to be used to implement national
policy during the period (year) considered under conditions of
cold, limited, and general war. It was a working plan, a praotical
guide for day-to-day or month-to-month operations. It was designed
1. To provide logistic planning guidance to
field commanders, including guidance for mobilization.
2. To initiate planning by field commanders to
insure adequate logistic support of Marine forces.
3» To provide for orderly assembly of men and
materiel for mobilization from M-day to M + 12 months.
4. To provide one basis for planning for
emergency supplemental fund requests. 1
It is to be noted that this latter purpose is the first
mention of "funds" in the planning process of I960. Although
dollars are necessarily implied in all the plans, they are not
specifically mentioned in the official directive until consider-
ation is given to the single-year, short-range plan.
1 Ibid., p. 5-2.
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Even without consideration of dollars or funding, it is
necessary that plans be translated into programs in order that
objectives may be achieved. The programs to which Marine Corps
planning in I960 related were internal functional programs
peculiar to the Marine Corps and used for internal management
purposes. These internal management-oriented programs formed the
framework of Marine Corps programming.
Marine Corps -pro grams . I960 .—The purpose of programming
was to set forth an orderly plan of administrative action to be
followed to enable the Marine Corps to carry out its missions.
Programming was designed to "span the gap between current
capabilities and intermediate objectives. The programming
process simply interrelated approved programs to each other and
to the planning process, on a broader base and in a more
definitive manner:
The program process is nothing more than the
determination of requirements for personnel,
equipment and supplies, facilities, or services,
by specific quantities, for2specific periods oftime, or at specific times.
All major administrative activities of the Marine Corps
were grouped with related or allied functions included in the same
major program. The preparation and use of functionally
categorized Marine Corps programs, eight in number, included three
elements: program development, program execution, and program
^Ibid.
,
p. 6-3. 2Blgger, op. clt .. p. 41.
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review. Each program was further divided into sub-programs which
were managed similarly to the major programs.
The Troop and Organization Program was the basic program
of the Marine Oorps. It included elements of both the Regular
and Reserve Establishments. This program set forth the present
and future organization and structure of the Marine Corps; the
remaining seven programs were derived from it. Figure 2 lists
the programs, their sub-programs and the staff who were assigned
responsibility for them. The Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps,
assisted by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans) and the Deputy Chief
of Staff (Research and Development), directed and coordinated the
overall development, execution, review, and analysis of all
Marine Corps programs.
Responsibilities for programming.—Specific responsibilities
were assigned to various Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) staff
officers to insure efficient, economical, and balanced support
of Marine Corps forces from their respective program areas.
The Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans) approved or secured
approval for program objectives and time schedules, promulgated
program documents, and integrated the required review and analysis
of programs. Planning and programming for research and development
(R&D), both operational R&D and materiel R&D programs, were the
responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Research and
Development). The Director of Aviation was responsible directly
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Aviation Program, Reserve plans and policies were coordinated by
the Director of Reserve. The Assistant Ohief of Staff (G-2) was
responsible for integration of intelligence plans and policies
into all appropriate programs.
The Fiscal Director had many and varied responsibilities
related to program performance. These included:
1. Insuring, along with Program Coordinators, that
programs were economically, yet efficiently, implemented.
2. Reviewing and analyzing program performance in light
of the CMC financial plan and of projected financial implications.
3. Projecting availability of funds to attain program
objectives.
4. Determining areas where financial reprogramming was
appropriate or required.
5« Making recommendations on funding and budgeting.
6. Insuring that administration of Marine Corps programs
and appropriations complied with law and the Commandant's
financial plan for operations.
7. Advising the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans) and Program
Coordinators of impending changes in the Commandant's financial
plan. 1
Each Program Coordinator (see Figure 2) was responsible
for overall coordination of development, execution, review and
^MCO P-3121.1, passim .
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analysis of his respective program and assigned sub-programs.
Each coordinator was required to develop program objectives,
recommend priorities for segments of the programs, and prepare
program documents for approval.
Sub-program administrators managed their assigned sub-
programs, determined its requirements, recommended annual
revisions, and submitted recommendations for accomplishment of
fiscal-year increments of their respective sub-programs.
Program development, I960 .—Program development involved
the determination of Marine Corps objectives, their translation
into program objectives, and the preparation of appropriate
program documents to define implementing procedures. Program
documents prescribed the implementing policies and selected
courses of action over the mid-range period. These policies and
courses of action were generally in terms of intermediate and
final objectives.
Wherever practical, quantitative statements expressing
objectives were desired in the program doouments; the policy
statements normally reflected priorities. Program documents were
also designed to show relationships of programs to budget
project(s).
Basically, the program documents served as a basis for
budget preparation, a point of departure for scheduling, and as a
yardstick for measuring progress. These program documents
concerned mid-range programs which were based primarily on Marine
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Corps Mid-Range Objectives; thus, a program document published in
late I960 (Fiscal Year 61) would cover the three years following
the next fiscal year (FY 62), or Piscal Years 63, 64, and 65, plus
three years of the mid-range planning period—FY 66, 67, and 68.
Six budget years, or annual "slices," were included in each program
document. Annual programs were derived from the mid-range programs
to cover the increment falling within the next fiscal year.
Programming and budget formulation, I960 . --Since funds were
budgeted and accounted for by appropriation accounts, each program
was associated with one or more appropriations which were managed
by appropriation sponsors. Each appropriation sponsor had primary
responsibility for a given Marine Corps appropriation. They
monitored preparation of appropriation estimates to insure inclu-
sion of requirements for approved programs and associated sub-
programs. In order to alter or modify approved programs,
appropriation sponsors required the concurrence of the respective
Program Coordinator and of the Piscal Director. Ho claim was made
that programming and budgeting were or should be "integrated" but
only that they were "reasonably in alignment with each other."
Budgeting action played a limited part in the early phases
of program development but assumed greater importance as the fiscal
year for the "program slice" drew nearer. The whole cycle was
geared to a specific fiscal year as shown in Figure 3.
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Marine Corps appropriations were involved in program
funding as were some twenty-five other Department of the Navy and
Department of Defense appropriations. Programs were required to
reflect Marine Corps total requirements for all appropriations
involved in order to provide adequate Justification for requests.
After "costing" by appropriation sponsors, the program
developed by a Program Coordinator was transmitted to the Piscal
Director for consolidation with other programs. After approval by
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the data (costs and estimates)
were forwarded for inclusion in appropriate budget estimates.
Program execution and program changes .—Scheduling for
program execution played a major role in programming. In Itself,
scheduling was not considered program execution, but as a means of
translating programs into actual operations.
Program execution included actual operations as well as
exeoution of prepared plans; thus feedback was generated during
program execution. Control of program execution relied on this
feedback generated by inspection procedures, the reporting and
accounting system, funding procedures (adjustments), and on basic
review and analysis procedures.
Changes to program documents for mid-range programs were
considered as major reprogramming efforts, and were generally but
once-a-year reviews. Short range program documents—single year
program increments—were changed with greater frequency, usually
as a result of changed annual objectives, resource availability,
rate of operations, or reduced appropriations.
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The annual budget was to be an expression of the annual
operating costs of all programs in terms of dollars. Revision of
programs necessitated by budget decisions was a process of making
choices between competing programs and objectives. Unresolved
differences between Program Coordinators were presented--via the
Fiscal Director for financial implications—to the Deputy Chief of
Staff (Plans) and generally resolved at that level. If necessary,
differences were resolved by the Commandant.
Program review and analysis, I960 .—All programs were
reviewed and analyzed on a continuing basis by Program
Coordinators and Sub-Program Administrators. Such review and
analysis was designed to measure progress, isolate problems,
report deficiencies, recommend revision, and identify any imbalance
within or among programs.
Formal review and analysis was kept as simple as possible.
No formal techniques were prescribed nor were periodic reports
apparently required except as a special requirement arose. Each
Program Coordinator was to design methods of review and analysis
which were tailored to his own program and was to draw information
from Sub-Program Administrators and cognizant staff agencies, as
required, to support his program.
Annual (short range) programs, I960 .—The annual programs




for the fiscal or budget year, were designed to facilitate
development of budget estimates to support them, and were referred
to as Marine Corps Annual Program Objectives. Annual Program
Objectives were used in budget preparation and justification, as
well as for a time unit of measure-of-progress toward mid-range
objectives.
They served as the point of primary contact between plans
and budget estimates. These Annual Program Objectives had to be
related to the basic programs and to show current requirements in
light of past accomplishments and future needs. The Annual Program
Objectives were designed to show a step-by-step relationship with
objectives of Joint Chiefs of Staff planning, since they derived
from a one-year slice of the Mid-Range Program Document, which in
turn was tied to mid-range planning.
Three revisions to the Annual Program Documents (Program
Objectives) were generally necessary: (l) after budget review and
mark-up at the Department of the Navy; (2) after budget review and
mark-up at the Department of Defense; and (3) after formal action
on appropriations by the Congress.
The state of the art, I960 .— This was planning and
programming of the Marine Corps in I960 as reflected by official
directives of that time. Planning was designed to support the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Program for Planning, and reached
forward some twelve years. Programming was concerned with
"spanning the gap between current capabilities and intermediate
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objectives," and reached forward some seven years.
Chapter V examines oertain impacts and effects on Marine
Corps planning and programming resulting from the Department of
Defense Program System introduced in 1961,

CHAPTER V
MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE PROGRAM SYSTEM, 1961-1965
Management review studies done by the Department of the
Navy in 1962 tended to show that the Marine Corps had less
difficulty in converting (responding) to the Department of Defense
program system than did the other services. These studies of
planning and programming functions were conducted by the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Appraisal Study Group as a part of the
overall management study commonly referred to as the "Dillon
Board."
Several reasons explain the Marine Corps 1 success in
responding to the program system: (1) its small size relative to
other services offered certain advantages, e.g., it had fewer
1Interview with Mr. E. F. Tabor, Head, Audits and Reports
Section, Analysis and Review Branch, Fiscal Division, Headquarters,
Marine Corps, Washington, D. C, February 18, 1965.
2Project director for these studies was Mr. John H. Dillon,
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Proof
copies of the studies were published as Individual Studies
Conducted as a Part of the Review of Management of the Department
of the Navy," Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C,
December 15, 1962. The study of planning, programming, budgeting,
and appraising, published as Study 2. Volume I of the Dillon Board




program elements; (2) centralized control and direction of Marine
Corps inputs allowed more direct response; and (3) the Marine
Corps had a good program system of its own in effect when the
Department of Defense program system was introduced, A finding
of the Dillon management study group was that "the planning and
programming office currently operating in HqMO /Headquarters,
Marine Corps7 appears to meet all Marine Corps needs." However,
this latter statement was made in 1962—a year or more after the
introduction of the Department of Defense program system. This
chapter will examine the revisions and changes in planning,
programming, and related areas required by the Marine Corps to
arrive at a position of "meeting all its needs" in relation to
the program system.
General considerations . --The introduction of the
Department of Defense program system was the major reason for the
restructuring of the Headquarters, Marine Corps, organization for
planning and programming in May, 1962. At that time, the overall
Marine Corps planning and programming effort was brought together
in the newly created office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans and Programs. This office is responsible directly to the
Chief of Staff and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps as
indicated in Figure 4.
Tabor interview, loc. cit .
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The old office of Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans) was
abolished and its functions and responsibilities were incorporated
into the expanded structure of the office of Deputy Chief of Staff
(Plans and Programs), A programs office, under the Assistant
Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs), was created to direct and
monitor both internal programming and Marine Corps participation
in the Department of Defense program effort.
The Marine Corps Planning and Programming Committee
membership was changed to reflect the organizational changes made
in Headquarters, Marine Corps. Members of the current committee
are:
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs)—Chairman
Deputy Chief of Staff (Research, Development, and Studies)
Deputy Chief of Staff (Air)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Director, Marine Corps Reserve
Piscal Director of the Marine Corps
Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps
Data Systems Officer of the Marine Corps (for data
processing matters only).
Representative, Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force
Development Activities (Associate Member).
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Personnel requirements to support Marine Corps planning
and programming since the introduction of the Department of
Defense program system have increased substantially. Programming
duties are authorized as full-time Jobs for one general officer
(Brigadier General, Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs)) and six
field-grade officers (two Colonels, four Lieutenant Colonels) in
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs) and for program
representatives in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Colonel), Office of Program Appraisal, Department of the Navy
(Colonel), the Navy's Program Information Center (Lieutenant
Colonel), and in the Navy Management Information Center (Colonel) .'
In addition, many Headquarters, Marine Corps, staff officers
devote considerable time to planning and programming functions in
3their jobs as program coordinators or appropriation sponsors. It
appears aafe to say that no office having planning or programming
1Interview with Lieutenant Colonel E. L. Barrett, Office
of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs), Headquarters,
Marine Corps, Washington, D. C, March 4, 1965. The contributions
of Lieutenant Colonel Barrett to this study were especially
valuable because of his experience with the program system and
his patience in answering many inquiries over a six-month period,
2 Ibid , These billets were created as a result of the
Department of Defense program system. Billets for planning
officers could not be attributed directly to the Department of
Defense system,
^No effort was made to identify all officers having
planning or programming duties in the Marine Corps, nor to relate
all personnel increases that occurred to the program system of
the Department of Defense.
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duties (both before and after 1961) has been able to reduce its
efforts or personnel staffing requirements as a result of the
Department of Defense program system.
The biggest obstacle encountered by the Marine Corps in
responding to the Department of Defense program system was this
requirement for greater numbers of officers to participate full-
time in the funotions of planning and programming at Headquarters,
Marine Corps. The "across-the-board" reporting and data
requirements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Imposed a
"very real initial burden" on a headquarters staff that was
already "lean" of senior officers in comparison to other service
1headquarters*
The personnel problem was not only quantitative; it was
qualitative as well. One officer expressed this qualitative
requirement substantially as follows:
This way of looking at decisions, and so forth,
has really escalated eduoation requirements of those
who are to work with it. Many of us have out-of-date
educations from before or during World War II; all
this is very foreign to us. It all goes back to a
people problem revolving around an Inheritance of
tradition and old ways of doing things. It is
difficult to aocept, to understand, or to promote
new ideas. • • • One can speak only in the most
laudable terms of the program system when you reckon
with this inheritance and the people who have literally
had to learn all over again to make it work. 2
'Barrett interview, loo, cit . Reporting requirements laid
upon Defense agencies "across-the-board, " with "little consider-
ation for discretion or for the burden on reporting units," was
also critioized by Mr. Daniel Borth in his article, "Dynamic
Accounting for Defense," The Federal Accountant . September, 1963 t
pp. 84-92.
2Volkert interview, loo, cit . The liberty of "quoting"
Lieutenant Colonel Volkert at some length was taken to- preserve
his particular insight to this problem.
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Planning and the program approach .—The Marine Corps
planning and programming system has been redesigned to accommodate
"to the maximum extent possible" the techniques, terminology, and
formats of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, and
Department of the Navy planning and programming systems. Since
1962, all planning and programming within the Headquarters has
been coordinated, if not actually accomplished, by the office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs). Early in 1965,
authorization was received by the Marine Corps to make this post
a three-star (Lieutenant General) billet, one of six in the
Marine Corps. Thus planning and programming are now being
directed and controlled at the highest levels of the Marine Corps.
Internal planning of the Marine Corps and participation in
or contribution to Department of the Navy plans is still considered
as service planning of a unilateral nature. A distinction is made
in the new planning and programming manual between planning for
Marine Corps commands under the direct military command of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and for those in the operational
2
chain of command of unified and specified commands. Those
commands directly under the Commandant "are responsive to JOS plans
^U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Manual for Planning and
Programming
. Headquarters Order P-3121.2 (Headquarters, U. S.
Marine Corps, Washington, D. C, 29 January 1965), P« 1-1- (Cited
hereafter as HQO P-3121.2).
Ibid ., p. 5-7* This chain of command extends from the
President, to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Commanders of the unified and speolfled commands.
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through Marine Corps Service plans," Those Marine Corps units
in unified and specified commands participate in joint planning
directly through their appropriate chain of command and respond in
this manner to Joint Chiefs of Staff Plans. 1
Marine Corps long range planning. 1965 .—The time frame of
long range planning has been pushed forward and stretched out over
a longer period than the planning period of I960, which was eight-
to-twelve years hence. The Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP)
presently proceeds from a "basis of appropriate studies ... to
provide an appraisal of the strategic and technological
environment envisaged for the long range time period 10 to 20
years in the future." It does not carry a specific year-to-year
designation, but will be updated as required.
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship of the Marine Corps
Long Range Plan (MLRP) to other planning and programming
activities.
Mid-range planning changes .—The Marine Corps Mid-Range
Objectives Plan (MMROP) replaced the Marine Corps Objectives Plan
(MOP) because the latter did not provide adequate guidance of
sufficient detail to meet new program requirements.
^HQO P-3121.2, op. olt .. p. 5-7. Frequent use was made of
this order in writing this chapter. No further footnotes will
identify such material except when quoting directly.
2HQ0 P-3121.2, p. 5-7.
^The old Objectives Plan covered only a three-year period,
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The new plan sets forth total Marine Corps requirements to
accomplish objectives approved by the Commandant and provides the
basic guidance for all Marine Corps programming effort.
Objectives of the Marine Corps Mid-Range Objective Plan (MMROP)
also furnish inputs to: (1) mid-range planning of the Chief of
Naval Operations, as contained in the Navy Mid-Range Objectives
Plan (NMRO), (2) the Navy Support Plan (NSP), and (3) the Joint
Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), developed by the Joint Chiefs.
lo provide a foundation for the development of Marine
Corps programs, as well as inputs for the plans mentioned above,
the Marine Corps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP) will contain: 2
(1) An appraisal of the strategic situation
relative to the roles and mission of the Marine
Corps, forecasted to prevail during the mid-range
period,
(2) A concept of Marine Corps operations for
cold, limited and general war, including projected
assignments of forces and their deployments during
the mid-range period,
(3) Force structure and organizational objective
concepts of the Marine Corps to be attained by the
end of the mid-range period.
(4) Marine Corps military objectives (require-
ments) for the end mid-range period, to include:
manpower, material, installations, aviation, training,
reserves, mobilization and research and development,
(5) Planning factors, criteria, standards and
formulas for computing requirements and readiness.
Data concerning programs for inclusion in the Marine
Corps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP) are displayed in program
element format.
2HQ0 P-3121.2, op. clt .. p. 5-9, 5-10.
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Staff review and analysis of the Marine Corps Mid-Hange
Plan (MMROP) must be continuous since it is a "dynamic plan
continuously effective for the future 9 years beginning at the end
of the current PX /fiscal year/, " Figure 5 shows the relationship
of mid-range planning (MMROP) to other plans and programs.
Short range planning, 1965 .—The Marine Corps Capabilities
Plan (MOP) has been retained as the basic short range planning
document, but its content and constructive time frame has been
extended. This plan now covers Marine Corps activities for the
next fiscal year (1 July-30 June) and the remainder of this fiscal
year (today to 30 June).
The Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MOP) outlines the
p
resources to be provided to accomplish training, maintenance,
equipment and employment objectives in the ensuing fiscal year.
It reflects the decisions of the planning, programming, and
budgeting process, including effects of decisions made outside the
Marine Corps.
As a service plan, the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan
(MOP) is prepared annually in support of the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) of the Joint Chiefs and complements the
Navy short range plan, the Navy Capabilities Plan (NOP). It is
quite comprehensive, containing within it personnel, logistic,
1 Ibid., p. 5-10.
^"Dollars, although not considered resources in themselves,
provide a -convenient method of comparing dissimilar resource
categories . . . ." HQO P-3121.2, op. cit .. p. 1-3.
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training, deployment, and mobilization planning. The relationship
of the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MOP) to other planning and
programming documents is also shown in Figure 5.
Joint long range planning changes .—-Important changes have
been made to joint planning emanating from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Chief among these changes is the replacing of the Joint
Long. Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) with a Joint Long Range
Strategic Study (JLRSS) whioh is prepared by the Joint Staff and
presented annually to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and
approval by 1 July (commencement of new fiscal year).
This Joint Long Range Strategic Study (JLRSS ) is a broad
strategio appraisal which provides concepts, trends, and strategic
guidance to assist in preparation of integrated planning within
the Department of Defense. It covers a four-year period,
commencing ten years hence. It thus provides the basis for long
range service plans, such as the Marine Corps Long Range Plan
(MLRP), and for similar studies by individual services, such as
the Navy Long Range Strategic Study (IffiRSS) which provides guidance
for long range planning in naval warfare
»
Joint mid-range planning changes.—The mid-range planning
period for Joint planning is now defined as beginning five years
subsequent to the fiscal year of approval and extending five years
thereafter. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) remains
iThese changes are related to, but could not be attributed
directly to, the introduction and operation of the Department of
Defense program system. They are considered here because Marine
Corps planning is responsive to Joint planning guidance*
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the Joint mid-range plan, but has been adapted to provide the
Secretary of Defense with military advice for development of the
annual military budget (within its time frame), and with a
reassessment of military aspects of the previously approved
annual increment of the Department of Defense Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Program,
While the Joint long range effort is an appraisal, the
mid-range plan (JSOP) provides planning guidance for development
of service plans concerning logistics, force levels, nuclear
weapons planning and damage considerations, communications, command
and control systems, as well as "development and employment of
space systems in support of military objectives."
Joint short range planning, 1965 .—The Joint short range
period still extends from 1 July for a period of one year, and
the short range plan, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSOP),
fulfills substantially its historical function of translating
national objectives and policies into terms of military objectives.
Greater stress on service coordination is evident in the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSOP), and the instructions
which accompany it, than was evident in I960 and earlier. Such
coordination has become increasingly important as planning has
'The service inputs to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
(JSOP) were "costed out for fiscal years 65 and 66 by the
individual services to provide such a capability. The majority
of cost computations for the Marine Corps input were done in the
Analysis and Review Section, Fiscal Division, Headquarters, Marine
Corps. (Tabor interview, loc. cit .
)
2HQ0 P-3121.2, QPo oit .. p. 3-4.
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become more concurrent and continuous during the period 1961-1965,
This concurrent, continuous nature of Joint, Navy, and Marine
Corps planning can be seen in the relationships shown in Figure 5»
It can be noted, also, that plans now receive inputs from the
Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program in the form of
decisions made by the Secretary of Defense.
This feedback to the planning process results from the
translation of previous plans into effective programs for
accomplishing the planned objectives. This translation of Joint,
Navy, and Marine Corps plans into formats compatible with Marine
Corps internal programs and with the Department of Defense Five
Year Force Structure and Financial Program has become the primary
function of Marine Corps programming in 1965.
Impacts upon Marine Corps programming * --The program system
of the Department of Defense has oaused Marine Corps programming
to be reoriented and to assume several simultaneous roles in order
to be responsive to both internal and external needs and require-
ments.
The purpose of programming in I960 was to provide an
orderly plan of administrative action for internal management
purposes. Marine Corps programming in 1965 is viewed as "a
fundamental function of the staff of the Commandant of the Marine
Corps" which translates Marine Corps plans into "detailed schemes
of action" which provide "a definitive force structure" and
"estimates of the resources required to achieve and maintain such
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a force structure." It "incorporates, where practicable, the
techniques, procedures, and formats prescribed for the programming
systems of the Department of the Navy and the Department of
Defense*"2
Marine Corps programming now stems from the basis of all
programming, the Department of Defense Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Program. 3 So that the Marine Oorps Mid-Range
Objectives Plan (MMROP) requirements are reflected in the Five
Year Force Structure and Financial Program (FYFS&FP), documentation
of program and cost data in each of the seven*" Marine Corps
programs (by program element or materiel item) allows extraction
of resource data and associated costs for preparation of Program
Change Proposals (POPs) to adjust the Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Program.
Program data in the Marine Corps program documents is
henceforth to be arranged sequentially by program element to
support two levels of programming;
1. The force structure, research, development
and studies effort, and resources authorized by the
Secretary of Defense.
5
1Ibid .. p. 8-1. 2 Ibid.
3 Ibid ., p. 8-5.
^Marine Corps programs have been reduced from eight to
seven since I960. The Research and Development Program now
Includes both operational and material research and development.
The seven programs are : Troop and Organization, Research and
Development, Manpower, Training, Installations, Materiel, and
Aviation.
^These data represent an expansion of information found in
the Department of the Navy Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program and thus represent a Marine Corps Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Program.
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2. The force structure, research, development
and study effort, and resources required to support
the true and total requirements as reflected in the
Marine Oorps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP). 1
A description of each current Marine Oorps program will
serve to show the relationship of the individual program to its
internal functions, to Marine Corps plans, and to the Department
of Defense Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan. These
relationships are also shown schematically in Figure 5. Current
Marine Oorps program descriptions are as follows if
Troop and Organization Program
The Troop and Organization Program Document
encompasses the development, display and management
of the total structure of the Marine Oorps. It is
the culmination of staff examination and development
of all elements of Marine Oorps structure in detail.
This staff effort includes analysis of the MMROP;
current force structure; the application of approved
amphibious doctrine and taotlcal concepts to the
present and future structure of the total Marine
Oorps; and the impact of decisions reflected in the
Department of Defense FYFS&FP.
Coordinator: Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-3.
Research, Development and Studies Program
Sets forth the operational requirements and
related materiel developments whose achievement will
lead to attainment of approved objectives in both
organization and combat capability; and outlines
the Marine Corps' RD&S effort associated with each
program element of the Department of Defense PYFS&PP.
Coordinator: Deputy Chief of Staff <RD&S).
%Q0 P-3121.2, op. cit .. p. 8-7. Resource and financial
data are arrayed over past, current, and following six fiscal
years for a total display of eight years; force structure data
and research, development and study effort data extend two
additional years.
^Description of Marine Oorps programs is taken from HQO




This Program Document sets forth the Manpower,
objectives to support the organization, composition,
and operational capability outlined in the T/0
Program Document and the manpower strength of the
Marine Corps as outlined in the Department of
Defense FIFS&FP.
Coordinator: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l.
Training Program
Includes all activities connected with training
military personnel both individually and in units
for attainment of skills and unit combat readiness
in support of approved objectives in organization
and operational capability; and the training which
is programmed in the Department of Defense FYFS&FP.
Coordinator: Assistant Chief of Staff, Gr-3.
Installations Program
The Installations Program Document sets forth
the installations and related logistic services
of and for the Marine Corps that are required to
support the achievement of approved objectives in
organization, deployment and operational capability;
and those installations and related logistic services
that are programmed in the Department of Defense '
FYFS&FP. The document will display military
construction programmed for the prior and current
fiscal years, plus the following 9 fiscal years.
Coordinator: Assistant Chief of Staff, Gr-4.
Materiel Program
The Document is concerned with the establishment,
display and management of the materiel and related
supply and logistic requirements of the Marine
Corps to support the programmed organization, employ-
ment and deployment of forces; and those resources
that have been programmed in the Department of
Defense FYFS&FP.




The Aviation Program Document is concerned with
the correlated development, display and management
of detailed aviation requirements to meet approved
Marine Corps objectives. It includes all aviation
data appearing in other Marine Corps Programs. The
Aviation Program Document specifically sets forth
the organization, research and development, manpower,
training, installations and materiel requirements to
meet approved objectives of the Marine Corps; and
those resources as approved in the Department of
Defense FYFS&FP.
Coordinator: Deputy Chief of Staff (Air).
These seven program documents of the Marine Corps are the
focal point for: (l) translating Joint, Department of the Navy,
and Marine Corps plans into action programs; (2) providing inputs
to Department of the Wavy (DON) and Department of Defense (DOD)
programs; (3) providing internal management guidance and
direction; and (4) assisting in annual budget preparation.
To this point, it has been noted that the Department of
Defense program system has had considerable impact upon the first
^Tabor interview, loc clt . : "All programs in which the
Marine Corps participates emanate from- CMC ^Commandant of the
Marine Corps/ approved plans . Without an approved plan, there is
no program.
20ne person interviewed toolc exception to the internal
program management function, calling it more "myth than method"
and advancing the following opinion: "It seems self-defeating -to
attempt to manage by the seven programs when Congress will continue
to provide funds only in terms of appropriations. . . • The seven
programs may be inter-tangled with, but are not yet interwoven
with, the DOD system or our own 'Duke's Mixture' of management




three "functions" of Marine Corps planning and programming listed
above; remaining to be considered is its effect on the budgeting
process.
Budgeting relationships to planning and programming .—An
objective of the planning and programming system in the Marine
Corps is to "systematically determine and present . . . budgetary
statements for the total Marine Corps."1 The development of the
annual budget request has been restructured as a result of the
Department of Defense program requirements for it now "must be
directly related to what is to be done in the future as reflected
2in programming documents." Thus budgeting essentially translates
program cost data into the appropriations format for the annual
budget request:
The portion of the total costs of approved
Marine Corps programs required during the budget
year equals the Marine Corps budget request for
that year, plus those portions of appropriations
not sponsored by the Marine Corps, but which
support it.
^
Translation from program to budget is a matter of
correlating budget terms with the program language in which Marine
Corps programs are developed: "It is first necessary to presume
the capability of doing what is programmed and then to analyze it
in detail and dollar terms to determine its feasibility within
l-HQO P-3121.2, op. Pit ., p. 1-1.





established parameters and within the time frame specified."
The Department of Defense program system has brought a
new philosophy to military budgeting. In some instances, the
budget process is still looked upon with annoyance, but no longer
can it be considered "an entity unto itself, " as expressed by
2Robert Anthony. The ability to budget cannot be isolated and
analyzed as such. In this regard, when the entire planning-
programming-budgeting system is looked at as a totality, one can
say that the Marine Corps' ability to prepare budget requests—and
to Justify these requests--has been improved as a result of
improved data availability resulting from the system.^ In
addition to assisting in budget preparation per se, the increased
data availability has had another significant effect: the Marine
Oorps now knows itself better than before; particularly it knows
its requirements, which can now be communicated in quantitative
4terms.
This improved ability to communicate requirements has
resulted recently in a significant authorized increase of personnel
for the Marine Oorps, an increase which has been sought for several
years. The Importance of knowledge of requirements plus an
^-Volkert interview, loc. clt .
2Robert N. Anthony, "New Frontiers in Defense Financial
Management," XI, The Federal Accountant . June, 1962, p. 24.
3Volkert interview, loc. clt .
4"2very Marine Oorps official interviewed responded that






increased ability to communicate these requirements was stated by
a budget officer in this manner
:
We are now, however, in a better position to
know what we need and how to justify it than we
have ever been. For example, this year we £the
Marine Corps7 received an increase of some three
thousand Marines. We needed them. We needed them
last year, too, and the year before that, but we
couldn't 'prove it" well enough, definitely enough.
With experience, we are getting better at that.
Although politics remain important determinants of
pbudgetary action, Marine Corps officers concerned with the budget
and program processes are impressed by the rewards of decisions
made on the "merits of the proposal" which seems a result of the
current planning-programmlng-budgeting sequence.
The planning, programming, budgeting sequence as addressed
by the Marine Corps in 1965 is shown in Figure 6. The traditional
"gaps" between planning, programming, and budgeting have been
bridged in theory by the Department of Defense programming
approach, but some remain in practice. The separation which remains
in practice between the processes in the Marine Corps has been
attributed to the lack of standardized cost data and cost
M/olkert interview, loc. clt . This observation supports
the tendency (noted in Chapter III) for the program system to
drive "requirements" upward.
Full disclosure to Congress and follow-up potential by
the Congress seems to be necessarily concomitant with program
proposals to the Congress: "Perhaps more persuasive even than our
ability to justify is our credibility rating on the Hill. We work
hard to, and intend to, maintain this rating, to keep this faith.
Without it, we'll be dead, in spite of reams of justification."
Volkert interview, loc. clt .














SEQUENCE OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING
DOCUMENT
. DESCRIPTION
The Marine Corps Long Range Plan (10-20 years in future)
consists:
1. Appraisal of strategic situation.
2. Long range concept of operations.
3. Long range force structure to he evolved.
Y 4. Estimate of Marine Corps requirements.
The Marine Corps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (2-10 years .
in future) consists:
1. Appraisal of Marine Corps roles and missions.
2. Concept of Marine Corps operations for cold,
limited and general war.
3. Force, structure and organizational objectives con-
cepts of the Marine Corps.
4. Planning factors.
The seven Marine Corps Program Documents provide infor-
mation for the internal program management by the EQMC
staff.
The Marine Corps Program Objectives: will contain in-
annual increments, the Marine Corps; force levels and
supporting programs necessary to achieve the CMC objec-
tives set forth in the MMROP.
The Department of the Navy Program Objectives contains
a formal and continual record of objectives approved
by SECNAV.
The approved DOD form used to propose and substantiate
changes to the FYFS&FP.
The Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program
includes:
1. Forces for the prior and current years and 8 FYs
beyond the current fiscal year.
2. The remainder of the program (i.e., manpower,
costs, materiel items, etc.) for the current FY
and 5 FYs beyond the current FY.
The Budget translates objectives set forth in program
terminology in the FYFS&FP to financial accounts pre-
scribed by law.
The Subject Issues transmit decisions of the SECDEF
during the budget cycle which are binding on the DOD
budget submission and PCP's considered in this cycle.
Changes to the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program is response to:
1. Format B's on PCPs.
2. Subject Issues on Budget.
The Marine Corps Capabilities Plan is:
1. The basic short range plan.
2. The outline of resources available.
3. The detailed expression of how CMC plans to employ
resources.
Figure L> ' The basic relationships and flow of information in the major docu-
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relationships between "macroviews of program elements" and
"budget dollars allocated" for provisions and maintenance of these
elements. In the Marine Corps, as in other services, this
problem remains: program decisions are not automatic, equivalent
budget dollar decisions. Costing difficulties, which seem to be
the cause of the differential, will be considered in the
concluding section of this chapter.
Cost consideration .—Cost is the single common denominator
that permits comparison of heterogeneous programs" (or which
allows translation of program terms to budget terms). Lack of
standardized cost computations, such as could be derived from a
valid mathematical cost model, aggravates the translation process.
The Marine Corps has no cost model at this time.
The present costing approaches use average costs and
linear estimates, which appear adequate for program costing of
large elements, but which present difficult problems of assessment
when "costing at the margin, " as in making incremental changes to
program elements.
•^•Barrett and Lynch interviews, loc. clt .
2Anthony, op. clt .. p. 20. The author was addressing his
attention to cost-effectiveness studies in this instance. Such
studies have not been conducted to date by the Marine Corps but
efforts are currently being made in this direction.
3The remarks in this section are distillations from many
sources. The Barrett and Lynch interviews of September, 1964,
opened this area which seems to be a vital one worthy of research
in depth by qualified researchers.
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Most of the Marine Corps cost data required are available,
but are often difficult and time-consuming to recover. A valid
cost model, constructed to reflect Marine Corps experience, would
be useful for routinizing future response to the programming
system. Such a cost model would be helpful in closing the
"estimates gap" mentioned earlier.
There are no ready-made cost models directly applicable
to cost computations for the Marine Corps; such models must be
carefully constructed by technically competent experts,
knowledgeable about Marine Corps affairs and experiences. The
more thought (not time) that goes into the construction and
testing of the models, the more usable will be the results and
the less costly will be the necessary revisions.
Rigid standardization of cost models on a Department of
Defense-wide basis, or composite models based on different
service experiences, does not appear desirable. A need does
exist for models of program elements and/or components, which
might practicably be standardized to some degree.
Development and use of cost models necessarily require
two considerations from the outset: (1) the models should be
developed and tested by knowledgeable experts who are aware of
the shortcomings and limitations of any model; and (2) as costs
per man, per tank, per ship go up or down, the models must be up-
dated (with equal precision as that which went into their





The Department of Defense program system is a centrally
controlled management system which uses economic analyses as a
decision tool and which is dependent upon the military
departments and other Defense agencies for the data on which
analyses are made and decisions are based. The basic goal of
this analytical method must be to make the data more understand-
able and useful by significant rearrangement and simplification.
The Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program
provides the format by which rearrangement, standardization,
and simplification of data inputs take place. Approved Program
Change Proposals complement and modify this format as decisions
are rendered by the Secretary of Defense concerning forces or
program elements.
The program system has improved the decision making bases
and has raised the decision power of the Secretary of Defense to
a level higher than at any time in the history of the Department
of Defense. There seems to be little doubt that the primary
unannounced goal of the program system was to concentrate decision
authority in the person and office of the Secretary of Defense




Centralization of authority in the office of the
Secretary of Defense, as civilian head of the Armed Forces and
Defense agencies, is in keeping with the governmental framework
of the nation. Critics of such centralization and concentration
of decision power generally attack the quality of the decision
rendered rather than the responsibility or right to make a given
decision.
It appears from this research that the quality of
decisions rendered has been high since the Department of Defense
program system was introduced in 1961. It further appears that
Increased data availability has been a major reason for the
quality of decisions during this period.
There seems to be but one universal criteria with which
to judge decisions, plans, programs, or budgets: it is that of
operational adequacy. Operational adequacy, as a principle,
implies the exercise of value judgments in the decision making
process. The Department of Defense program approach seeks to
limit the number of times and the number of levels at which value
judgments are allowed to influence the making of decisions which
the Secretary of Defense deems to be of significance to the total
defense effort or mission execution of a department or agency.
It cannot be stated that decisions are rendered solely on results




Regardless of the decision base, there seems to be
substantial evidence that the program system has had a
beneficial effect upon the planning, programming, and budgeting
process of the Marine Corps. The planning and programming
structure of the Marine Oorps has been rebuilt to accommodate
the requirements of the Department of Defense program system and,
in the process, has increased its own potential for internal
management.
The Marine Oorps now has more and better information
concerning its resources and its requirements than ever before
and is attempting to improve and extend this knowledge and the
data base which underlie it. The increased data requirements of
the Department of Defense program system prompted and has
sustained the Marine Oorps search for information concerning its
present and future needs and the resources which will be required
to meet these needs.
The overall functions of planning, programming, and
budgeting within the Marine Oorps in 1965 have definite sequential
interrelationships and are designed to be performed concurrently
and continually. Execution of these interrelated functions will
generate and sustain plans, programs, and budgets that are
mutually supporting and which are responsive to the internal
management needs of the Marine Corps and the requirements of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the offices of the Secretary of Defense,
and other external agencies.

88
Ihe documents developed through the planning, programming,
budgeting functions are designed to share a common stream of
data that can be traced from one document to another. Thus the
framework for an integrated, one-time entry data system exists
in these management areas, but, as of this writing, such
integrated processing is not implemented to any appreciable
degree. When a truly integrated data system is developed for
program data, many of the difficulties now experienced in
translation from plans to budgets will be lessened.
The planning, programming, budgeting changes brought
about by the Department of Defense program system have been seen
to be generally procedural in nature. The identification of
these procedural Impacts was the basic purpose of this research.
In the research for and the writing of this paper, two impacts,
not of a procedural nature, were also identified which may have
long range significance for the Marine Corps and which appear
worthy of exploration through additional research. These impacts
are: (1) the requirement imposed upon Marine Corps leaders and
planners to look beyond, as well as within, the organizational
boundaries of the Marine Corps for the effects of their actions
and decisions; and (2) the continuing and increasing need for the
development of expertise within specified and specialized areas
of Marine Corps management; expertise which is based on both
education and experience, neither of which seems to be a direct
substitute for the other.
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The final conclusion drawn from this research is that the
skills and attitudes of the people directly concerned with the
program system will determine the success or failure of the
system within the Marine Corps and within the Department of
Defense more certainly than will the techniques and formats by
Which it is implemented.

APPENDIX
LIST OF PROGRAM ELEMENTS IN DOD FYFS&PP TO WHICH
MARINE OORPS RESOURCES ARE CHARGED1
Program Element Number Program/Program Element Title
I STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES
1 15 05 01 2 Missile Forces, Sea Based
Fleet Ballistic Missile System
II CONTINENTAL AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
FORCES
Surveillance and Warning Systems
2 15 25 01 2 Airborne Dew Line Extension
2 40 65 01 2 Headquarters and Command Support,
Navy
III GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
/ Attack Carrier Strike Forces
3 12 05 05 2 OVAN - ENTERPRISE
3 12 05 10 2 CVA - New (FY 63 and Later)
3 12 05 15 2 CVA - FORRESTAL Class
3 12 05 20 2 CVA - MIDWAY Class
3 12 05 25 2 OVA - ESSEX/HANCOCK Class





3 14 05 01 2
3 14 10 01 2
3 14 15 01 2
i
3 14 30 01 2
3 18 05 01 2
3 20 05 01 2
3 22 05 01 2
3 24 25 01 2
3 26 15 01 2
3 26 20 01 2
3 28 05 01 3
3 28 10 01 3
3 28 15 01 3
3 28 25 01 3
3 28 30 01 3
3 28 35 01 3
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Program/Program Element Title
Surveillance and Ocean Control
Forces
ASW Aircraft Carriers







Special Combat Support Forces
Special Combat Support Forces
Logistic and Operational Support
Forces
Fleet Support Squadrons










Other Combat Support Forces
Supporting Bases and Activities

Program Element Number
3 28 40 01 3
3 28 40 95 3
3 28 41 01 3
3 28 45 01 3
3 32 05 01 2
3 32 10 01 2
3 32 15 01 2
5 10 34 05 3
5 10 34 10 3
5 10 34 15 3
5 20 10 40 2
5 20 14 01 2
5 20 16 05 3
5 20 16 10 3
5 20 16 15 3





Marine Corps Air Stations and
Facilities
Headquarters, Fleet Marine Forces





RESERVE AND GUARD FORCES
General Purpose Forces
(Marine Corps Division/Wing Team
Reserve)
Divisional Type Units
Wing and Aviation Support Units
Other FMF Units MOR
General Support
NROIC
Headquarters and Command Support-
Navy Reserve
Recruit Training, Marine Corps
Reserve









6 22 50 01 3
6 22 53 01 3
6 22 98 90 3
6 42 18 03 3
6 42 18 06 3
6 52 02 03 2
6 52 02 06 2
6 52 96 90 3
7 04 08 01 2
7 04 10 01 2
7 04 12 01 2
7 06 02 01 3
7 06 04 01 3
7 06 05 01 3
7 06 06 01 3
7 06 08 01 3






Marine Corps Ord/Combat Vehicle
Exploratory Development
Other Marine Corps Exploratory
Developments
Marine Corps Support to AGILE
Engineering Development—Navy




Facilities & Installation Support
Pacific Missile Range
Marine Corps Support to DDC
GENERAL SUPPORT




Headquarters and Command Support







Headquarters and Command Support

Program Element Number
7 12 14 01 2
7 12 18 01 2
7 12 20 01 2
7 12 34 01 2
7 12 50 01 2
7 12 93 90 3
7 12 94 90 3
7 22 02 01 2
7 22 95 90 3
7 32 38 01 2
7 34 36 01 3
7 34 38 01 3
7 34 44 01 3
7 34 96 90 3
7 39 09 01 3
7 52 60 01 2
7 52 80 01 2












Marine Corps Support of NSA
Marine Corps Support of DIA
Communications--Navy
Navy Communication System
Marine Corps Support of DCA
Logistic Support--Navy
Procurement and Supply Operations
Logistic Support—Marine Corps
Transportation
Procurement and Supply Operations
Material Maintenance
Marine Corps Support of DSA
Military Family Housing
Military Family Housing—Marine






Program Element Number Program/Program Element Title
Command and General Sup-port
—
Marine Corps
7 54 60 01 3 Command and Direction
7 54 62 01 3 Recruiting and Examining
7 54 74 01 3 Transients, Patients and Prisoners
7 54 82 01 3 Other Support Activities
National Military Command System
""(NMCA l
7 58 16 01 2 National Emergency Command Post
Afloat (NSCPA)
Defense Atomic Support Program
—
Navy
7 64 97 90 3 Marine Corps Support of DASA
OSD Support—Navy
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